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THE ARCHITECTURE OF JAPAN’S MARITIME- 
SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
The Dual-Layer Security System and the Role of the  
Japan Coast Guard
Kentaro Furuya
 Security operations in the East China Sea (ECS), particularly around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, have become a very high priority for the Japanese 
government� Its stance on the Senkakus is that the islands constitute an integral 
part of Japanese territory, both historically and under international law, and that 
the Japanese government has administered the islands effectively�1 In contrast, 
the Chinese government began to assert ownership over the islands after the 
United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East conduct-
ed research in 1968 that indicated the possibility of oil and gas resources beneath 
the seabed in the area�2 Additionally, the Chinese government steadily expanded 
its dispatch of China Coast Guard (CCG) ships to the islands after 2012, when the 
Japanese government decided to transfer ownership of some of the islands from 
private parties to the Japanese government (see the figure)� Since then, bigger, 
strengthened, and armed CCG ships frequently have shown their presence by 
approaching and intruding into territorial seas off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands�3
How does the Japanese government peacefully secure and guard its maritime 
border against ships operated by a foreign authority? Since Japan is an island 
nation, it has no land borders, only maritime ones� Two organizations are re-
sponsible for securing and guarding Japanese territorial seas and maintaining 
order at sea around Japan: the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)� The JCG is a nonmilitary, civilian law-enforcement 
agency, whereas the JMSDF is a military and naval agency� This article includes 
analysis of the different functions of the two organizations�
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The Japanese government considers that CCG ships in the Japanese territorial 
waters under discussion are not exercising the right of innocent passage under in-
ternational law, and it regularly deploys JCG ships to counter the CCG ships� The 
JCG patrol ships are the primary actors during peacetime, exercising their police 
powers at the maritime borders by conducting guard and security operations� In 
exceptional cases, JMSDF ships are deployed to counter threats; however, such 
measures still fall within the scope of law-enforcement operations governed by 
Japanese domestic law� This Japanese policy—of having two layers of protection 
that normally confine their functions to law enforcement—is unique, including 
in the way in which it applies in the East China Sea�
In the East China Sea, although JCG and CCG ships face off against each other 
almost every day, tensions in the vicinity have remained relatively low� Although 
the ships of the two services often operate close together, even side by side, in 
the contiguous zone and territorial sea, there has been no collision, shouldering, 
or bumping between patrol ships� According to JCG statistics, in 2015 the CCG 
intruded into Japan’s territorial sea thirty-five times, involving ninety-five ships, 
and cruised in the contiguous zone on 240 days, with a count of 709 ships�4 Over-
all, this means that CCG ships showed their presence within the contiguous zone 
on almost every nonstormy day, while they intruded into the territorial sea oc-
casionally� Beyond that, the situation deteriorated further in 2015 as, for the first 
time, CCG ships fitted with arms aboard were continuously present on the scene�
In August 2016, the JCG found a swarm of Chinese fishing boats—some two 
to three hundred—escorted by thirteen CCG ships, approaching the Senkaku Is-
lands; subsequently, a record number of CCG ships—eleven—intruded simulta-
neously into the territorial sea� During this incident, even though JCG and CCG 
ships operated close together, even side by side, not a single incident or accident 
occurred of patrol ships colliding with or shouldering each other, nor did the 
situation escalate into a military confrontation�5
The JCG is the primary organization charged with conducting operations 
to guard and secure the Senkakus� Many consider it to be more than a “mere” 
law-enforcement organization� Richard J� Samuels describes the JCG as being 
“quasi-military” and constituting the “fourth branch” of the Japanese military, 
and points out that Japan altered its security policy to integrate police and mili-
tary functions at sea�6 Lyle J� Morris further concludes that the JCG has become 
capable of using force for defensive purposes� He drew this conclusion after 
studying the law-enforcement operation that the JCG conducted off Amami- 
Ō-shima in Japan’s Ryukyu Islands in 2001, in which JCG ships exchanged fire 
with a spy boat from North Korea until its crewmembers apparently blew up 
their own boat�7 Regarding the roles of the JCG and JMSDF in the security sys-
tem, David Leheny describes the JCG as “the canary in the coal mine,” using that 
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metaphor to suggest that the JCG is used to test public opinion on whether an 
extension of the JMSDF’s role would be found acceptable�8 Céline Pajon further 
points out that, barring an exceedingly clear and well-established legal frame-
work for separate roles of the JCG and JMSDF in providing maritime security, 
the two services need to extend and expand their interoperability—which would 
mean the JCG playing more of a military role�9 None of these analyses, however, 
addresses the distinction between the functions and roles of the JCG and JMSDF 
in guarding and security operations� Furthermore, it appears that no published 
articles have analyzed the architecture of the Japanese maritime-security system�
This article analyzes the Japanese maritime-security architecture by using 
operations in the East China Sea as an example� First, it examines the legal 
framework of maritime-security operations, the duties the JCG and JMSDF 
perform, and the interrelations between the services� Under Japanese law, the 
JCG is a civilian law-enforcement agency only, with no military role� Thus, it is 
prudent for the Japanese government to be ready to mobilize JMSDF assets even 
for law-enforcement operations� This requires careful study of mechanisms to 
avoid military confrontations, especially any escalation of the situation in the 
East China Sea� The Japanese government endeavors to maintain the rule-based 
order at sea by exercising the police power—regardless of which agent, the JCG 
or JMSDF, it uses to do so� In furtherance of its policy, the Japanese government 
clearly separates the roles and functions of the JCG from those of the JMSDF� 
The two services are the constituent parts of the Japanese dual-layer maritime-
security system� The JCG, a civilian law-enforcement agency, goes on scene as the 
primary actor to take necessary measures, while the JMSDF becomes the primary 
actor only when the situation goes beyond JCG capabilities� This architecture 
contributes to the maintenance of order in the East China Sea�
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DUAL-LAYER SECURITY SYSTEM
The JCG is tasked to perform law enforcement and maintain good order at 
sea� The JCG’s duties and functions are laid out in articles 2 and 5 of the Japan 
Coast Guard Act�10 The service is the first responder for various incidents at 
sea� Guarding and security operations in the vicinity of maritime borders and 
remote islands constitute a major duty of the JCG� But when the Japanese gov-
ernment deems a situation involving maritime security at sea to have exceeded 
the capabilities of the JCG, it may initiate a maritime security operation (MSO), 
as provided under article 82 of the Japan Self-Defense Forces Act (JSDF Act)�11 
When this second layer is reached, units of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 
are tasked to respond� When an MSO is ordered, the JMSDF, as the naval arm of 
the JSDF, becomes the primary actor during the operation and takes over from 
the JCG the function of maintaining good order at sea�
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It is noteworthy that MSOs are defined as law-enforcement operations even 
though Japan’s naval organization becomes the actor� Therefore, the general rules 
for the use of force by police officers apply� However, when an armed attack from 
outside the country is threatened or it becomes clear that Japan is in imminent 
danger of suffering an armed attack, the Japanese government may switch from 
conducting a law-enforcement operation to a defense operation, under article 
76 of the JSDF Act�12 Until that point, it is merely a matter of which service, the 
JCG or the JMSDF, is designated to take the necessary measures; either way, the 
operation remains within the paradigm of law enforcement� The Japanese gov-
ernment prefers to use the law-enforcement power to maintain good order at sea 
and adheres to this policy as strictly as possible�
The First Layer: The JCG
The Role of the JCG. The JCG is a nonmilitary law-enforcement organization� 
When the service was established in 1948, Japanese ports and ships, having been 
the primary targets during World War II, were still devastated� In addition, over 
seventy thousand underwater mines had been left behind after the war’s conclu-
sion, which hindered the safety of navigation in coastal areas�13 Moreover, po-
litical confusion and the disestablishment of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 
allowed heinous criminal activities at sea, such as the smuggling of people, drugs, 
and other commodities� Because the prewar maintenance of good order and the 
conduct of law-enforcement operations at sea had been heavily dependent on the 
IJN, there was no police force to deploy at sea after the war� The need for a mari-
time police force to maintain good order at sea was obvious and became a matter 
of interest to the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Al-
lied Powers (GHQ) as well� On April 27, 1948, the first version of what is now the 
JCG Act was promulgated, and on May 1 the agency was inaugurated officially�14 
Thus, under the occupation of Japan, it became the responsibility of the Japan 
Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA), which was renamed the JCG in 2000—not the 
navy—to enforce laws and regulations for the maintenance of good order and 
safety at sea�
The Korean War broke out in 1950� Soon after, the GHQ ordered the Japanese 
government to establish the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Security 
Force�15 Since the Allied force essentially departed for the Korean Peninsula, the 
need to fill the vacuum back in Japan made the establishment of a new defense 
organization essential� The Maritime Security Force was organized as a department 
within the JMSA� In August of that year, the Maritime Security Force was reorga-
nized as one department of the National Safety Agency, an independent organiza-
tion� In 1954, the National Safety Agency was renamed the JMSDF as a result of 
establishing the JSDF�16 Thus, historically the JCG and the JMSDF were created as 
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parts of the same body, but subsequently were separated and have developed inde-
pendently into organizations exercising police and military powers, respectively�
Duties and Functions of the JCG. The duty of the JCG to maintain safety and se-
curity at sea is set out in article 2 of the JCG Act� The service fulfills various roles 
and performs various functions, including maintaining good order at sea, patrol-
ling the territorial seas, suppressing and investigating crimes, conducting search 
and rescue, protecting the marine environment, carrying out hydrographic sur-
veillance, and ensuring the safety of maritime traffic� In this provision, sea means 
not only the Japanese territorial seas and the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 
that are under Japanese sovereignty and sovereign rights, respectively, but also 
seas in general, including the high seas�17
It also is salient that JCG officers are authorized to act as judicial police 
of f icers—reinforcing the 
characterization of the JCG as 
a law-enforcement authority�18 
JCG officers are authorized to 
exercise such police powers 
as conducting investigations, 
performing arrests, executing 
search-and-seizure warrants, 
conveying the results to the 
public prosecutor’s office, and 
contributing to follow-up investigations�
It also is noteworthy that the JCG Act was amended to clarify that the main-
tenance of maritime order is a primary duty and function of the JCG� In 2011, 
the Japanese government initiated a review of the JCG’s maritime police power 
to meet the needs of the modern security environment off the Senkaku Islands� 
It decided to amend the JCG Act to enable the service to exercise its police power 
more rapidly and effectively� Previously, establishing a legal basis to warn, say, 
CCG ships that they were not exercising the right of innocent passage was a 
shared function among government institutions, not a primary responsibility of 
the JCG� The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) determined whether the activ-
ity constituted a breach of international law, and if it did so the MFA could ask 
the JCG to warn the offender and request that the activity stop� This process was 
often time-consuming and redundant� An amendment passed in 2012 made “the 
maintenance of good order of ships’ navigation” a primary duty and function of 
the JCG�19
This amendment was significant in the context of the possibility of taking 
measures against Chinese ships operated by Chinese authorities in the ECS� 
In August 2016, the JCG found a swarm of 
Chinese fishing boats . . . approaching the  
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Escorting them were 
. . . CCG ships—triple the usual number. . . .  
CCG ships intruded into Japan’s territorial 
sea. . . . Nevertheless, the Japanese government 
did not order an MSO to supplement the JCG 
ships with JMSDF destroyers.
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Japanese domestic law cannot be applied against these Chinese ships owing to 
exemption clauses, and such vessels enjoy immunity from enforcement jurisdic-
tion under international law� Under such circumstances, the JCG could not take 
enforcement measures on the basis of domestic law, even though these activities 
breached rules under international law and disrupted good order at sea� But 
while activities such as public ships not exercising the right of innocent passage 
in Japanese territorial seas do not constitute a violation of Japanese domestic 
laws, because of the exemption clause, when ships do not comply with the rules 
for exercising the right of innocent passage their activities do, in fact, constitute 
a disruption of the good order of ships’ navigation� Another example is when a 
foreign ship operated by a foreign authority conducts maritime scientific research 
within Japan’s EEZ without the consent of the government; this is considered a 
breach of international law�20 However, it does not constitute a violation of Japa-
nese domestic law, owing to a similar exemption clause in the relevant act� This 
amendment clarified that the JCG could take administrative measures against 
these activities, in accordance with relevant provisions in the JCG Act, even 
though the breach was not of national laws but of international laws�
As stressed in the JCG Act, the salient aspect of the JCG is its nonmilitary na-
ture� Even though the service was modeled after the U�S� Coast Guard, which is 
one of the armed services of the United States, article 25 of the JCG Act explicitly 
denies that the JCG is a military institution or that it may function as such, since 
at the time of the JMSA’s establishment the Allies did not want it to be part of any 
remilitarization of Japan� Today this nature of the service is well established—and 
it becomes more important when the JCG is put under the control of the Min-
istry of Defense, as may happen in exceptional circumstances�21 Even then, the 
operations of the JCG remain restricted to the duties and functions defined in 
the JCG Act, and the service is prohibited from engaging in any military opera-
tions� In such cases, the JCG is expected to restrict its role to countersmuggling 
and search-and-rescue operations and the like� Thus, the JCG legally is a civilian 
law-enforcement agency at all times�
Relevant Statutory Authority of the JCG and Its Officers. For the JCG to pursue 
its duties and functions, the JCG Act provides its officers with statutory authority� 
Among other things, article 17 of the act provides the authority to board and 
visit a ship, ask questions of its captain and other relevant persons, request docu-
ments and certifications for verification, and inspect both vessel and cargoes� 
When a ship is under way, JCG officers may order it to stop for boarding and 
inspection� If the ship does not comply, and if deemed necessary, the officers may 
board the ship coercively�
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However, to be subject to inspection, ships need to be under Japanese juris-
diction� For example, when sailing on the high seas a foreign ship remains under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag state; JCG officers are allowed to board it 
only with the authorization of the flag state or in accordance with international 
law, such as in cases of piracy� Foreign ships may exercise the right of innocent 
passage through Japan’s territorial sea; therefore, the officers need to exercise cau-
tion in considering whether the situation allows boarding and inspection under 
international law as well as domestic law�
Second, when it is determined that a crime is about to be committed at sea 
or that the public order at sea is likely to be seriously disturbed, JCG officers 
may take measures immediately, without waiting for warrants or decisions from 
a court� When officers find—on the basis of “a reasonable judgment, from the 
appearance of the vessel, manner of navigation, abnormal behavior of the crew 
members, and other surrounding circumstances”—that no appropriate alterna-
tives exist, article 18(2) allows JCG officers to take measures such as stopping 
the ship, altering its course, or moving it to a designated area� Thus, this article 
provides the JCG with some of the powers necessary for maintaining good order 
at sea�
Use of Force by JCG Officers. Regarding the use of force by JCG officers in law-
enforcement operations, the general rule applicable to the use of force by police 
officials applies� Article 20(1) of the JCG Act prescribes that “Article 7 of the Law 
Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials (Act No� 136 of 1948) 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the use of arms by Coast Guard officers�” Article 
7 of that law reads as follows: “A police officer may use his weapon in case there 
is reasonable ground to deem it necessary for the apprehension of a criminal or 
the prevention of his or her escape, self-protection, or protection of others, or 
suppression of resistance against the execution of his official duty, within limits 
judged reasonably necessary in the situation�”22
An additional element is necessary to meet the requirement for any use of 
force that may injure a person� Such exceptions apply in cases of legal defense (ar-
ticle 36 of the Criminal Act [Law No� 45 of 1907]) and emergency refuge (article 
37 of the same law), and when a person who has committed a serious crime—one 
rendering him eligible for the death penalty or imprisonment for more than three 
years—resists officers in the execution of their duties, including arrest, and when 
no alternative measures are deemed to exist�23 In short, the general rules on the 
use of force, including the standards on proportionality and necessity, always 
apply to the use of force by JCG officers, and only when no alternative measures 
exist may officers use force against a person� Thus, the use of force by police of-
ficials, including JCG officers, is strictly controlled under domestic law�
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However, there are two situations in which JCG officers may use force beyond 
the general rules discussed above: when countering spy-boat operations and in 
the course of counterpiracy operations� In the former case, article 20(2) of the 
JCG Act applies� This provision allows for an expanded use of force if JCG of-
ficers find grounds—applying reasonable judgment to the given situation—to 
believe that no other means are available to stop a suspicious boat that ignores 
orders to heave to and resists JCG personnel in the performance of their duties� 
Under such circumstances, the JCG commandant may find—given the appear-
ance of the boat, its mode of navigation, the behavior of its crewmembers, other 
surrounding circumstances, or related information—that it is reasonable to apply 
the provision� Under the provision, the following conditions apply: (1) the vessel 
in question is a foreign ship not exercising the right of innocent passage, but is 
not a warship or a ship owned or operated by a foreign government and used only 
for noncommercial purposes; (2) such navigation is likely to be repeated in the 
future; (3) it cannot be excluded that the purpose of the navigation is to prepare 
to carry out heinous criminal activities in Japan; and (4) unless the JCG conducts 
a boarding and inspection of the boat and takes necessary measures, the criminal 
activities cannot be avoided in the future�24 This provision was drafted very care-
fully, and cannot be applied to any incident other than a spy-boat case� Thus, no 
matter how serious the current guard and security operations in the ECS become, 
this provision would not apply, since spy boats are not the issue there�
In the case of counterpiracy operations, article 6 of the Act on Penalization of 
Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy (Law No� 55 of June 24, 2009, 
as amended, hereafter the Japanese Counterpiracy Act) applies a general rule for 
the use of force by police officers, then further provides that JCG and JMSDF of-
ficers engaged in counterpiracy operations under the act may use weapons to “the 
extent judged to be reasonably necessary by the circumstances if there are suf-
ficient grounds to believe that there are no other means to stop the pirate boat�”25 
This provision enables the firing of warning and disabling shots against a pirate 
boat, even if such use of force may cause injury to people on board� The under-
lying rationale is that once pirates successfully board another ship, measures to 
secure the lives of the seafarers on the ship being attacked become significantly 
restricted—pirates likely would use seafarers as human shields�26 This provision, 
however, does not apply to guard and security operations against public ships that 
do not qualify as pirate vessels under international law�
The Second Layer: The JMSDF
MSOs and the Role of the JMSDF under the JSDF Act. The JSDF has two kinds of 
duties� First, article 3 of the JSDF Act prescribes the primary duties of the JSDF as 
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defending Japan’s peace, independence, and security� Second, the act prescribes 
as a secondary duty the maintenance of security and good order, thereby enabling 
the second layer of the Japanese maritime-security system, in the form of MSOs�
However, until the Japanese government activates the MSO provision, a 
JMSDF unit has no legal authority to conduct security operations at a scene� 
The JSDF Act provides a “positive list” of legal bases for mobilizing JMSDF units 
to counter threats� Unless and until one of the provisions listed in the act is ap-
plied, the JSDF has no legal basis to mobilize for particular purposes� The act’s 
article 82, inter alia, is relevant to security operations at sea� “[W]hen especially 
necessary to protect life or property or maintain public order at sea, the Minis-
ter of Defense may, with the approval of the Prime Minister, order Self-Defense 
Forces units to undertake the necessary operations at sea�”27 Under this article, 
“especially necessary” is construed as a situation that requires capabilities beyond 
those of the JCG�28 Moreover, the mention of “life or property” in this provision 
is interpreted to refer to those of Japanese citizens�29 However, the geographical 
area of the operation is not restricted to Japan’s territorial seas but includes the 
country’s EEZ as well as the high seas�30
Examples of MSOs. From the establishment of the JSDF in 1954 to the end of 
2017, only three MSOs have been ordered� The first case occurred in 1999�31 On 
March 23 of that year, the JMSDF discovered two suspicious fishing boats in its 
territorial sea, in the Sea of Japan� As the first responder, the JCG dispatched 
patrol ships and airplanes to the vicinity for identification, boarding, inspections, 
and detention, as necessary� When patrol ships and helicopters spotted these 
boats, the spy boats started to flee at high speed from the JCG units’ pursuit� The 
patrol ships fired warning shots to stop the boats, but they were ignored, and the 
JCG could not stop the boats� The Japanese government decided to order the 
first-ever MSO to pursue and stop the boats� JMSDF destroyers and airplanes 
pursued the boats and fired repeated warning shots, but the boats left the Japa-
nese air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) and escaped toward North Korea� 
At this stage, the Japanese government terminated the MSO, since it hesitated 
to use air assets beyond the ADIZ; it sought to avoid unexpected encounters or 
incidents with other military airplanes�32
The second case occurred in 2004� On November 10, the JMSDF spotted a 
submerged submarine, later identified as a Han-class Chinese submarine, near 
Japan’s territorial sea off Ishigaki Island in Okinawa Prefecture� Once the subma-
rine entered Japan’s territorial sea between Miyako and Ishigaki Islands, the Japa-
nese government initiated an MSO� The intent was to request that the submarine 
surface or to expel it from the territorial sea and watch its subsequent direction 
of travel� Later, the Japanese government lodged a diplomatic protest with the 
Chinese government, which expressed regrets in response�33
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In the third and most recent use, an MSO was invoked to counter Somali 
piracy in 2009� Since the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean constitute 
vital shipping lanes for Japan and acts of piracy had affected the Japanese ship-
ping industry, the Japanese government determined to take actions to prevent 
criminal activities targeting both Japanese and other ships� The government 
ordered the JCG to conduct a feasibility study of the service’s capability to deploy 
patrol ships to the vicinity, in its role as Japan’s primary law-enforcement author-
ity at sea� The study determined that the JCG Act contained no geographical 
limitation, so law-enforcement operations in the Gulf of Aden could fall within 
the JCG’s scope of duties� However, it was not feasible to deploy the JCG’s assets 
to the Gulf of Aden since the JCG had too few patrol ships capable of performing 
counterpiracy operations on the high seas at that distance from Japan for months 
at a time� Besides, the design, 
construction, and subsequent 
structure of the patrol ships 
(e�g�, the damage-control sys-
tems) were not appropriate 
for use against pirates’ possi-
bly heavy weapons, nor were 
the communication systems 
of the patrol ships appropri-
ate for interchanges with warships deployed to the vicinity for joint operations� 
Therefore, the Japanese government ordered that an MSO be conducted until 
adoption in June 2009 of the Japanese Counterpiracy Act, which made counter-
piracy operations a new function of the JSDF�34
In two additional circumstances an MSO may be initiated, through a cabinet 
order� In the first scenario, a need arises to counter a submerged submarine in the 
territorial sea or internal waters of Japan� The first such order was promulgated 
in 1996, prior to the actual case of the Han-class submarine in 2004, at the time 
of Japan’s ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)�35 
Article 20 of UNCLOS provides that, in such circumstances, a submarine is re-
quired to navigate on the surface and show its flag� The Japanese government de-
cided to set out the procedures through which JMSDF units could be mobilized 
smoothly should a submerged submarine be found within the territorial sea in 
the future� After the 2004 Chinese submarine incident, the government reviewed 
its policies and adopted accelerated procedures for conducting the decision-
making process by phone�
The second cabinet order for an MSO applies to scenarios involving noninno-
cent passage of foreign “warships�”36 This change followed the increase in activity 
by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy ships around Japan’s remote islands 
If the Japanese government does not provide 
sufficient explanation and information re-
garding the justification for and appropriate-
ness of its invocation of an MSO, it will not 
obtain support from the Diet and the public, 
which are particularly sensitive to the mobili-
zation of JSDF units.
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(including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)—not necessarily within the territorial 
sea�37 When the Japanese government determines that foreign warships in Japan’s 
territorial sea are not exercising the right of innocent passage, it requests that the 
warships leave the territorial sea immediately, in accordance with international 
law� The cabinet orders the MSO immediately, pursuant to article 82 of the JSDF 
Act� This cabinet order aims to ensure that necessary measures are taken against 
unlawful activities, they are executed in a seamless manner, and the closest co-
operation and coordination are facilitated, including the exchange of relevant 
information among different government agencies� As of the end of 2017, there 
has been no case in which the Japanese government has needed to initiate an 
MSO in this manner�
Conditions for Initiating an MSO: A Preliminary Assessment. The foregoing dis-
cussion of the instances in which MSOs have been ordered and the two cabinet 
orders laying out other possible scenarios shows that the Japanese government 
takes a cautious approach to invoking MSOs� It addresses each possibility objec-
tively and on a case-by-case basis�
For example, the government does not decide whether to initiate an MSO on 
the basis only of the level of intensity of activity, even though it is an influential 
factor� Note that it ordered an MSO in the spy-boat incident in the Sea of Japan 
in 1999, whereas it elected not to order an MSO in the similar spy-boat case in 
2004, in which the boat sank in an explosion during a shoot-out with the JCG off 
Amami-Ō-shima�38
Moreover, since the 1999 spy-boat incident, JCG patrol ships’ capabilities 
have been enhanced in terms of speed, maneuverability, and armament� So that 
JCG ships could stop spy boats in the future, the Japanese government decided 
to introduce new patrol ships capable of higher speeds and with more-accurate 
fire-control systems� The availability of these patrol ships, along with the 2001 
amendments to the JCG Act that permitted extended use of force against spy 
boats, enhanced the JCG’s ability to respond, which led to a higher bar for the 
invocation of an MSO� This explains, in part, why no MSO was invoked in the 
later spy-boat case, even though the intensity of the second case was higher�
Other elements, such as the number of ships and boats subject to law- 
enforcement measures, would be considered when deciding whether to order an 
MSO, but would not be decisive factors either� In August 2016, the JCG found 
a swarm of Chinese fishing boats—on the order of two to three hundred— 
approaching the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands� Escorting them were thirteen CCG 
ships—triple the usual number� A record-high eleven of the CCG ships intruded 
into Japan’s territorial sea simultaneously�39 Nevertheless, the Japanese govern-
ment did not order an MSO to supplement the JCG ships with JMSDF destroyers� 
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The next month, more than two hundred Chinese fishing boats, allegedly en-
gaged in coral poaching, were spotted off the Ogasawara Islands, south of Hon-
shu, the main island of Japan, but no MSO was invoked�40
However, should the scenarios anticipated in the cabinet decisions—namely, 
submarines operating submerged or warships operating in Japanese territo-
rial seas in a manner not in keeping with the exercise of the right of innocent 
passage—occur, an MSO will be ordered� The decisions establish situations al-
ready deemed to be beyond the capability of the JCG to respond� JCG patrol ships 
cannot detect and issue a warning to a submerged submarine and demand that 
it surface, so the counteroperation is best conducted by the JMSDF� In a case of 
noninnocent passage of warships—again considering the weaponry systems and 
other equipment fitted aboard the respective ships and the signals traditionally 
used between naval ships—the JMSDF would be the best choice to conduct any 
counteroperation�
Political sensitivity adds another element to interpreting and applying what is 
considered to be beyond the capability of the JCG� If the Japanese government 
does not provide sufficient explanation and information regarding the justifi-
cation for and appropriateness of its invocation of an MSO, it will not obtain 
support from the Diet and the public, which are particularly sensitive to the 
mobilization of JSDF units� In addition, the government needs to consider the 
signals it might be sending to other states and international society, and related 
implications�
Therefore, the government will initiate an MSO only when both technical 
and political conditions are met� Until then, the basic policy of the Japanese 
government is to take full advantage of the JCG and its police power� As much 
as possible, to avoid political turbulence, the service works autonomously, in ac-
cordance with established laws and regulations, with no need to seek or invoke 
political decisions in particular cases�
Statutory Authority of JMSDF Units under an MSO. Under the JSDF Act and 
in an MSO, JMSDF units at sea can take “necessary measures,” but those are re-
stricted to law-enforcement measures� First, the JSDF Act clearly distinguishes 
the MSO from defense operations� Therefore, the law-enforcement principles of 
proportionality and necessity apply strictly to actions taken pursuant to an MSO� 
For example, article 93 of the JSDF Act provides that article 7 of the Police Duties 
Execution Law—the general rule on the use of force by Japanese police officers, 
incorporating the principles of proportionality and necessity—applies mutatis 
mutandis to the use of force by JSDF officers in an MSO� In addition, under ar-
ticle 20(2) of the JCG Act, while force may be used by those engaged in counter-
ing a spy-boat incident, that latitude does not apply to other cases�
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Second, other police powers that JCG officers are authorized to exercise under 
article 17, such as conducting boardings and inspections and asking questions, 
and the coercive measures with immediate effect authorized under article 18, ap-
ply to units (whether maritime, air, or even ground) conducting an MSO as well� 
However, since JMSDF officers are not authorized to act as judicial police officers 
under the Criminal Procedure Act (Law No� 131 of 1948), they cannot investi-
gate, conduct interrogations, or execute judicial warrants; JSDF officers engaged 
in an MSO must cooperate with JCG officers when an investigation is necessary�
Interoperability between the JCG and JMSDF. It is worth noting that the JCG 
and JMSDF barely have interoperability� First, the equipment and design of JCG 
patrol ships and of JMSDF destroyers represent different operational concepts� 
Article 4(1) of the JCG Act stipulates that patrol ships should have the structure, 
equipment, and function appropriate to pursue coast guard roles and functions—
in other words, not for military purposes� The assets and equipment available to 
the JCG emphasize the service’s identity as a civilian police agency� For example, 
the operating systems and equipment of JCG patrol ships are similar to those 
on merchant ships, whereas the JMSDF applies military specifications (specs), 
which often require more sophistication� The information a commercial system 
obtains may not satisfy military specs� The weapons systems on JCG patrol ships 
are for warning and disabling purposes, not for destroying ships� These differ-
ences in structure and equipment make it difficult for the two types of ships to 
operate together even when in the same theater�
Second, the different functions, operations, and cultures of the two orga-
nizations influence their potential interoperability�41 The JCG, as a dedicated 
maritime law-enforcement organization, must comply with the necessity and 
proportionality principles whenever it takes coercive measures that include the 
use of force� Its operations are restricted by human rights law, including the right 
to life and liberty� The ultimate purpose of police activity is to suppress criminal 
activities and maintain good order� Doing so at sea typically involves stopping 
and boarding ships and arresting—alive—those aboard bearing responsibility 
and delivering them for prosecution by a criminal court� Article 25 of the JCG 
Act does not allow operations of the JCG to include military functions, and JCG 
officers do not identify themselves as military personnel� In contrast, the JMSDF 
is a military organization, and its function is to defend the nation and its politi-
cal independence and territorial integrity from external threat� Although certain 
norms must be observed even during armed conflict, including humanitarian 
law, the JMSDF may be called on to destroy enemy ships when necessary� These 
differences in functions, operations, and cultures hinder sharing between the 
command-and-control systems of the two organizations, so interoperation be-
tween the two organizations rarely occurs�
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However, there are indications that these two organizations are moving to-
ward operating in closer cooperation� First, after the 1999 spy-boat incident that 
initiated the first MSO, the JCG and JMSDF began drafting what subsequently 
became a joint-operation manual�42 This process provided opportunities to un-
derstand both the differences between and the similarities in JCG and JMSDF op-
erations� Later, counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden provided increased 
opportunities to work together� Assignment of JCG officers to law-enforcement 
detachments (LEDs) embarked in JMSDF destroyers to facilitate judicial proce-
dures continues to improve the relationship between the two organizations�
Accomplishing a seamless and smooth transition from the JCG to the JMSDF 
when an MSO is ordered is the key to a successful operation� Since the command-
and-control mechanisms and the maneuverability of the ships of each organiza-
tion are so different, and since by definition the threat posed extends beyond 
the capability of the JCG assets, JCG vessels are likely to withdraw from the 
theater once JSDF units arrive on the scene� In such cases, on-site information 
exchange—including possession of a common operational picture and shared 
understandings of intended strategy—is essential�
SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
As noted, the Japanese government attempts to contain guard and security op-
erations in the East China Sea within a law-enforcement paradigm� To do so, it 
first evaluates any entrance of CCG ships into Japan’s territorial sea around the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands under international and national law� Then it analyzes 
the options it may choose to pursue as law-enforcement measures in accordance 
with international and national law�43
Rights and Actions
The Japanese government acknowledges the right of innocent passage by war-
ships and foreign ships owned and operated by other governments for noncom-
mercial purposes (except those carrying nuclear weapons)�44 So, legally speaking, 
CCG ships may exercise the right of innocent passage through Japan’s territorial 
sea�45 However, the stance of the Japanese government is that when CCG ships 
encroach into Japan’s territorial sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands they are 
not exercising the right of innocent passage under the provisions of UNCLOS�46
For instance, in December 2008, CCG ships entered into the territorial sea 
around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and cruised, hovered, and drifted for ap-
proximately nine hours� The Japanese government did not consider this behavior 
to comply with the definition of passage under article 18 of UNCLOS� More-
over, the Chinese government announced that the CCG ships were conducting 
“law-enforcement activities�”47 Law-enforcement activity by foreign ships in 
Japan’s territorial sea can be regarded as “any other activity not having a direct 
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bearing on passage,” which is the formula given in article 19(2), item (l) of 
UNCLOS—if not a violation of Japanese sovereignty—thus rendering the pas-
sage not innocent� Therefore, the Japanese government determined that the CCG 
ships in the territorial sea were not exercising the right of innocent passage�
As of the end of 2017, the Japanese government continued to maintain this 
interpretation� It considers the frequent encroachments by and continuous pres-
ence of CCG ships in Japan’s territorial sea to constitute neither an invasion nor 
a state of hostilities�48 As far as the Japanese government is concerned, the behav-
iors of the CCG ships constitute a failure to exercise the right of innocent passage 
in keeping with international law, making it a law-enforcement matter, to which 
it is the consistent policy of the government for the JCG—its primary maritime 
law-enforcement actor—to respond with appropriate measures�
However, what those available measures are is debatable� First, article 25 of 
UNCLOS provides the coastal state a right of protection, allowing it to “take nec-
essary steps to prevent passage 
which is not innocent” in its 
territorial sea� Although this 
provision of the convention 
does not define necessary steps 
in detail, the term may be 
interpreted within a broader 
context, leading to the conclu-
sion that such steps against a 
vessel not properly exercising the right of innocent passage include requesting 
that the ship stop for inspection, arresting persons on board, and detaining the 
ship; shouldering and bumping the ship to expel it from the territorial sea; and 
even, as a last resort, using force against it�49 Such ships would fall under the full 
jurisdiction of the coastal state�50 The conditions governing these measures in the 
article are that they are aimed at preventing noninnocent passage and are to be 
performed within the territorial sea�
Second, article 32 of the convention recognizes the immunity of warships 
and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes� Since patrol 
ships are categorized among the latter, they enjoy immunity from the enforce-
ment jurisdiction of the coastal state� Therefore the coastal state cannot exercise 
its enforcement jurisdiction, including the stopping, boarding, arresting, and 
seizing functions discussed previously� Significantly, the use of force would 
not be allowed except for domestic law-enforcement purposes� Article 301 of 
UNCLOS, which reflects article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits any threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state when a party state exercises its rights and duties under UNCLOS� In 
In December 2008, CCG ships entered into the 
territorial sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Is-
lands and cruised, hovered, and drifted for ap-
proximately nine hours. The Japanese govern-
ment did not consider this behavior to comply 
with the definition of passage under . . .  
UNCLOS.
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addition, Japanese domestic law substantially restricts the use of force in a law- 
enforcement operation� As explained in the previous section, a JCG officer may 
use force only (1) to apprehend criminals or prevent criminals from escaping, (2) 
for self-protection or the protection of others, or (3) to suppress resistance to the 
execution of his official duties� Since CCG ships, as patrol ships, are exempted 
from Japanese domestic laws and regulations and thus fall outside the scope of 
their application, the conduct of these ships does not constitute a criminal viola-
tion; therefore, case (1) above does not apply� Case (3) is construed to apply only 
when officers must take coercive measures to suppress resistance� Because CCG 
ships enjoy immunity, the JCG would have little cause to exercise its enforcement 
jurisdiction and take coercive measures in support thereof, so case (3) hardly 
applies either� Thus, only case (2) represents a realistic scenario in which JCG of-
ficers might use force� And if all the officers on scene carefully observe the rules 
of national and international law, including the immunity of warships and patrol 
ships, the likelihood that force would end up being used would be quite low�
Considering these rights under international law and the relevant restrictions, 
the measures the Japanese government would take may not include the exercise 
of enforcement jurisdiction� Under UNCLOS, a coastal state has a right of protec-
tion, but CCG ships enjoy immunity from enforcement jurisdiction� Therefore, 
if CCG ships do not exercise innocent passage, JCG ships issue warnings and 
request that they leave the territorial sea immediately�51 They may sail side by side 
with such ships to prevent them from approaching the territorial seas and the 
islands� However, they do not board, inspect, search, seize, or arrest, since such 
activities would be construed as exercising enforcement jurisdiction� If CCG 
ships perform any further malicious activities, such as risking lives on Japanese 
ships, the stance of the Japanese government is that the JCG ships may take pro-
portional measures against that conduct, as far as is permissible under interna-
tional law� In such cases, the Japanese government does not consider the use of 
force to be excluded, but it nonetheless is severely restricted, as discussed above�52
Evaluation of Past and Ongoing ECS Security Operations
From the point of view of maritime-security strategy, it sounds reasonable for 
a coastal state to use its navy—the most robust power at sea—to maximize 
the power of guard and security operations in its maritime border zones� The 
Chinese government is procuring more, and more heavily armed, patrol ships� 
This implies that more-capable CCG ships may be deployed in the East China 
Sea� It would become more difficult for JCG ships to deal with these CCG ships� 
However, employing JMSDF assets—Japan’s second layer—in the East China Sea 
likely would lead to deterioration of the situation, since the Chinese side likely 
would feel the need to counter by deploying its naval assets to restore the balance� 
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A regional arms race probably would ensue, involving further deployments of 
much larger and more-sophisticated warships, and the confrontation would 
escalate� Thus, this balance-of-power strategy does not work for maintaining the 
status quo�
Alternatively, if relevant states remain within the paradigm of law 
enforcement—by exercising self-restraint and restricting their actions—they can 
maintain the status quo� In the East China Sea, the Japanese government exercises 
self-restraint by maintaining its law-enforcement approach and by refraining 
from advertising the presence of the JMSDF, the system’s second layer� Remain-
ing within the paradigm of law enforcement means that the measures taken are 
governed and restricted by international and national law that reflects the basic 
principles of law enforcement�
As long as China follows a similar policy, with the states merely maintaining 
order by observing international and national law in the East China Sea, it is 
reasonable for Japan to remain within the paradigm of law enforcement� Unless 
a Chinese ship takes further dangerous actions, such as risking life at sea, inter-
national law during peacetime barely allows the employment of robust measures, 
including the use of force, because of the immunity that patrol ships enjoy� Even 
when exceptional circumstances permit the use of force, such use still must fol-
low strictly the principles of necessity and proportionality� Besides, the weaponry 
systems fitted on Japanese patrol ships are minimal, intended solely to enable law-
enforcement operations, not war fighting and ship sinking� Therefore, the JCG, as 
a civilian law-enforcement authority, does not represent a threat of hostilities, so 
it can serve as a buffer, helping to avoid a military confrontation in which a single 
miscalculation could lead to rapid deterioration of the situation� Adherence to 
the law-enforcement paradigm—by observing both international and national 
law and exercising a coast guard police power—can contribute to maintaining the 
rule-based order in a more suitable way�
The essential intent of the dual-layer system is to keep military elements away 
from the scene of confrontations whenever possible� There are at least three good 
reasons to attempt to do so� First, the presence of JCG patrol ships implies that 
Japan is governing and administering the islands effectively� Since the precon-
dition of exercising jurisdiction is that the islands properly fall under Japanese 
jurisdiction, the presence of patrol ships enforcing domestic laws implies that 
the Japanese government administers and governs the islands� This is in confor-
mity with the Japanese policy position that there is no territorial issue in the East 
China Sea� In contrast, a continuous presence of JMSDF destroyers would suggest 
the possible existence of a territorial issue, thereby evidencing a discontinuity 
with Japanese policy� So the absence of military elements and the presence of 
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civilian law-enforcement patrol ships represent a constant reinforcement of the 
government’s position�
Second, the dual-layer system allows the allocation of a single function to 
each layer—a significant advantage� If the system had only a single layer, the navy 
would have to provide both functions: deterrence and active measures� The navy 
indeed has the capabilities to do both; however, the presence of excessive power 
at the scene is not desirable in politically sensitive circumstances� The other side 
would adjust its capabilities to the same level, escalating the situation to a navy-
on-navy confrontation� The advantage to a state of using a dual-layer system is 
that it can deploy, as the first layer, assets with capabilities appropriate to dealing 
with situations at the scene, while it uses the second layer as a deterrent while re-
serving its remaining power farther from the scene� In this manner, the Japanese 
government keeps on-scene confrontations manageable�
Third, the role of coast guards is to provide protection and maintenance of 
the rule-based order, and such services are expected to work for safety; they 
often are likened to a shield� One function of the police power is to enforce 
national laws to materialize legal interests� When a domestic law is enforced 
in the maritime arena by a coast guard, the coast guard exercises its power in 
accordance with international law, including respecting the scope of states’ 
jurisdiction and the immunity of warships and public ships operated by govern-
ments for noncommercial purposes� Under international law, proper exercise 
of the police power does not harm any foreign state� Therefore, a coast guard 
functions as a defensive shield and is not offensive at all� By using the JCG to 
maintain the legal order in the East China Sea, the Japanese government shows 
that it intends to do so in a way that avoids escalation and military confronta-
tion� In contrast, the use of a military organization, which is likened to a pike, 
may render provocative and offensive implications, including a suspicion that 
future escalations are possible�
Besides, coast guards cooperate substantially with neighboring states in pursuit 
of performing their duties better� Coast guards need to cover vast areas of oceans 
with a relatively small number of assets� Therefore, international cooperation 
among coast guards is essential, such as when coordinating search-and-rescue 
operations and suppressing transnational crimes at sea; maintaining dialogue, 
building confidence, and expanding mutual understandings are significant inter-
ests for coast guards� For example, the JCG and CCG have a history of cultivating 
cooperation and mutual understandings in the performance of their duties� To 
cultivate international cooperation further, the JCG added to existing bilateral 
dialogues by initiating multilateral frameworks, such as the North Pacific Coast 
Guard Forum and the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, to both 
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of which the CCG is a party� Notwithstanding tensions in the East China Sea, 
communication and dialogue among coast guards are maintained through 
these meetings, and mutual understandings are fostered through joint exer-
cises and joint fishery-surveillance patrols� The respective services expect these 
confidence-building structures and activities to assist in avoiding rapid escalation�
This article has analyzed Japan’s maritime-security architecture in the East China 
Sea� It portrayed that Japan’s policy is to endeavor to remain within the paradigm 
of law enforcement and thereby keep the overall level of confrontation in the East 
China Sea manageable� To do so, it employs a dual-layer system whose constitu-
ent parts are the JCG and the JMSDF�
The JCG represents the first layer of the system and the primary actor in 
confrontations with Chinese counterparts in the East China Sea� The JMSDF, 
the second layer of the system, displaces the JCG as the main actor only when 
the Japanese government determines that a situation has extended beyond the 
capabilities of the JCG, and implements an MSO� Until then, the JMSDF’s main 
role is deterrence; this maximizes the flexibility of Japanese strategy�
The analysis found the current guard and security operations that the JCG 
performs in the East China Sea to be law-enforcement operations conducted 
in accordance with existing domestic and international law� The Japanese gov-
ernment deems the current overall confrontational situation to constitute not 
hostilities but a breach of international law, and in response takes measures that 
remain within the limits of national and international law� This approach reflects 
Japan’s maritime-security strategy, which respects the rule of law and freedom of 
navigation�
The article also analyzed the mechanisms that work to maintain tensions at 
a manageable level� The situation suggests that Tokyo and Beijing do not want 
any further escalation in the East China Sea, and that they understand that coast 
guards are more appropriate for supporting the rule-based order than maintain-
ing a balance of power using naval assets would be�
Nonetheless, challenges to the effective working of the system remain� First, 
the assets of the JCG and its personnel need to be enhanced� Even with the de-
terrent effect of the second layer, the Japanese government needs to maintain a 
continuous presence of JCG units around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands� Given the 
Chinese government’s “salami-slice tactics,” by which it pursues its interests and 
asserts its claims step by step, the Japanese government must be able to demon-
strate that the islands are under continuous Japanese governance�53 To counter 
salami slicing, such as the use of drones from patrol ships and the use of maritime 
militia disguised as fishermen, the JCG needs to review its capabilities; JCG assets 
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deployed in the vicinity must have sufficient capacity to perform guard and secu-
rity operations while countering whatever Chinese assets are present�
Second, to maximize the deterrent effect of the second layer, close cooperation 
between the JCG and JSDF is essential� Until the second layer is activated under 
an MSO, the JSDF’s primary role is deterrence� Added to the capabilities of the 
JCG, the thick and robust second layer of the JSDF provides collective deterrence� 
So even when JSDF assets do not participate directly in on-scene confrontations, 
the deterrence they provide helps with the implementation of Japanese policy 
and contributes to its flexibility� Yet the JSDF may need to strengthen this deter-
rent effect further through its close alliance with the U�S� Navy� This alliance has 
been the linchpin of the security environment in Northeast Asia� Making the link 
between the two navies even 
closer would reinforce collec-
tive deterrence�
Third, the JCG and the 
JSDF, as well as other govern-
mental institutions, need to 
develop their collective capa-
bility to gather and analyze 
the information necessary to determine whether an MSO should be activated� 
Almost any activation of an MSO would lead to the conclusion that the Japanese 
government had escalated the situation� After that, decision-making becomes 
much more difficult� Therefore it is essential to support policy makers’ determi-
nation of whether to initiate an MSO by exchanging information and contribut-
ing to analysis within an appropriate time frame� The relevant institutions need 
a system through which all actors can provide, pool, and draw on information so 
that the necessary decisions can be made without delay�
Fourth, as the Japanese government endeavors to maintain the rule-based 
order in the East China Sea, it should maintain its policy of relying on the police 
power as much as possible� In March 2018, the Chinese government announced 
a restructuring of various governmental bodies�54 Although governance of the 
CCG is not yet fully clarified, the service was placed under the People’s Armed 
Police, a paramilitary organization, and under the direction of the Central Mili-
tary Commission� With this change, CCG ships might be deemed naval ships, 
making it more likely in future confrontations that the Japanese government 
would implement an MSO under the existing cabinet decision� The Japanese gov-
ernment has not revealed its stance on this matter, but it should continue to exert 
the police power of the JCG as its first response� The government should continue 
to profit from the dual-layer system in which the JCG and the JMSDF each plays 
[T]he JCG, as a civilian law-enforcement 
authority, does not represent a threat of hos-
tilities, so it can serve as a buffer, helping to 
avoid a military confrontation in which a 
single miscalculation could lead to rapid dete-
rioration of the situation.
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   47 8/23/19   9:18 AM
21
Furuya: Maritime Security—The Architecture of Japan’s Maritime-Security S
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 4 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 1. For an example, see Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
record of press conference, June 9, 2016, 
available at japan.kantei.go.jp/.
 2. “Trends in Chinese Government and Other 
Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the  
Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response: Rec­
ords of Intrusions of Chinese Government 
and Other Vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea,” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www 
.mofa.go.jp/; Masahiro Miyoshi, “Seabed Pe­
troleum in the East China Sea: Law of the Sea 
Issues and the Prospects for Joint Develop­
ment,” Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter 
.org/.
 3. “Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2016,” 
Japan Coast Guard, p. 15, www.kaiho.mlit 
.go.jp/.
 4. Ibid., p. 16.
 5. “Status of Activities by Chinese Government 
Vessels and Chinese Fishing Vessels in Waters 
Surrounding the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 26, 2017, 
www.mofa.go.jp/; “Japan Coast Guard Annual 
Report 2017,” Japan Coast Guard, pp. 15–17, 
www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/.
 6. Richard J. Samuels, “‘New Fighting Power!’ 
Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and 
East Asian Security,” International Security 32, 
no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008), pp. 84–112.
 7. Lyle J. Morris, “Blunt Defenders of Sover­
eignty: The Rise of Coast Guards in East and 
Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review 70, 
no. 2 (Spring 2017), pp. 75–112.
 8. David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, 
Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006),  
p. 165.
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a single role until the situation escalates beyond the capabilities of the JCG. When 
the situation reveals that use of the JMSDF has become more appropriate, the 
government may activate an MSO, in line with the cabinet decision. Until then, 
the JCG is the more suitable tool for maintaining order in the East China Sea.
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